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Abstract
The application of the Internet of Things concept in domains such as industrial control, building automation, human health,
and environmental monitoring, introduces new privacy and security challenges. Consequently, traditional implementation
of monitoring and security mechanisms cannot always be presently feasible and adequate due to the number of IoT devices,
their heterogeneity and the typical limitations of their technical specifications. In this paper, we propose an IP flow-based
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) framework to monitor and protect IoT networks from external and internal threats in
real-time. The proposed framework collects IP flows from an IoT network and analyses them in order to monitor and detect
attacks, intrusions, and other types of anomalies at different IoT architecture layers based on some flow features instead of
using packet headers fields and their payload. The proposed framework was designed to consider both the IoT network
architecture and other IoT contextual characteristics such as scalability, heterogeneity, interoperability, and the mini-
mization of the use of IoT networks resources. The proposed IDS framework is network-based and relies on a hybrid
architecture, as it involves both centralized analysis and distributed data collection components. In terms of detection
method, the framework uses a specification-based approach drawn on normal traffic specifications. The experimental
results show that this framework can achieve & 100% success and 0% of false positives in detection of intrusions and
anomalies. In terms of performance and scalability in the operation of the IDS components, we study and compare it with
three different conventional IDS (Snort, Suricata, and Zeek) and the results demonstrate that the proposed solution can
consume fewer computational resources (CPU, RAM, and persistent memory) when compared to those conventional IDS.
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IoT is a fairly recent model that empowers novel applica-
tions in different domains such as industrial control,
building automation, health, and environmental monitor-
ing, thus making the security and privacy of IoT data a key
point of concern.
With the increasing number of devices being connected
to the Internet, the network administration activities such
as devices management, traffic monitoring and security, are
a subject that must be on everyone’s mind [1]. According
to Bradley et al. [2] and Lee and Lee [3], by 2020 there will
be fifty billion devices connected to the Internet, and each
individual will own around seven devices. Also, with the
speedy progress of IoT that is penetrating the mainstream,
more and more IoT data is being transmitted over networks
and Internet, thus making it more exposed to attacks and
increasing the risk of cyber security attacks [4].
Sha et al. [5] have stated that designing specific security
mechanism for IoT systems is far from simple because the
IoT landscape is heterogenous, fragmented and not sup-
portive of interoperability. Some security solutions such as
a lightweight version of Datagram Transport Layer Secu-
rity (DTLS) [6], Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [7] or
even the IEEE 802.15.4 link-layer security [8], have been
proposed to improve data confidentiality, authentication,
access control, trust, and privacy within IoT networks
[9–12]. However, even with these mechanisms, IoT net-
works are still exposed to attacks and intrusions [13].
Zarpelao et al. [13], Santos et al. [14], and Hajiheidari
et al. [15] highlight the necessity for the development of
more IoT-directed security tools and argue that systems
like Intrusion Detection System (IDS) could be used to
address that necessity.
Regardless of the use of IDS technologies in conven-
tional networks, existing solutions are inadequate to be
applied to IoT networks as their architecture is not flexible
enough against the complex and heterogenous IoT
ecosystem [16]. The characteristics of IoT components,
such as resource constraints, large scale, heterogeneity,
preference of functions over security, higher privacy
requirements, low-cost design, and harder trust manage-
ment, make it extremely difficult to use conventional IDS
solutions. As argued by Sha et al. [5], network architecture,
scalability, heterogeneous devices and communications,
integration with the physical world, resource constraints,
privacy, the large scale, trust management and lesser
preparation for security, are aspects that both explain and
enforce the need for development of IDS for IoT.
To understand the context behind the development of
IDS solutions for IoT networks, the existing literature on
the topic has been analysed. According to Zarpelao et al.
[13] and Santos et al. [14], just a few of the existing works
on IDS development were specifically focused on IoT
systems. The referred authors have also stated that it is
necessary to develop solutions that are able to: (a) defend
against a wide range of attacks; (b) provide variety in
detection technics; (c) address more IoT technologies; and
(d) secure IDS alert traffic and management.
In order to contribute to the mitigation of the problems
identified above, we propose a flow-based Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) framework to protect IoT networks
from external and internal threats in real time. The pro-
posed framework was designed to consider both IoT net-
works architecture and other IoT contextual characteristics
such as scalability and heterogeneity. The framework
presented follows a network-based approach and follows a
hybrid architecture as it involves both centralized and
distributed components. Regarding the detection method,
the proposed framework uses a specification-based
approach. The collection of network data is made using
probes in all IoT layers which are responsible for collecting
the IP flows. Collected IP flows are forwarded to the central
IDS components that are responsible for analysing them to
detect attacks, intrusions, and other types of anomalies. The
IDS components apply specification-based methods based
on normal IP flows traffic specifications. The central IDS
components can be placed on the IoT border router, on a
dedicated machine or on a cloud-based system. The com-
munications between the probes and the central IDS
components are made over secure channels to avoid
security and privacy issues. Finally, in our proposed
framework, no software modification of IoT devices and
application is required. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper represents a novel approach as it encompasses an IP
flow-based IDS to IoT networks.
The contributions and findings of the proposed work are
summarized as follows:
• Proposal for a framework for intrusion detection in IoT
systems for detecting internal or external intrusions in a
timely manner.
• Proposal for a pattern of characteristics and specifica-
tions of IoT communications made through application
protocols such as CoAP and MQTT.
• Development of a prototype to test and evaluate the
proposed framework, simulating an IoT environment.
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces some relevant terms regarding IoT and
IoT security. Section 3 details the basic notions of flow-
based network traffic monitoring systems, providing a
revision of relevant terms and applications. Section 4
introduces relevant terms regarding IDS and present the
most important IDS solutions for IoT. In Sect. 5, we
describe our proposed design, including the architecture
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and its main components and, in Sect. 6, the framework is
evaluated. Finally, in the 7th section, we present a brief set
of conclusions complemented with future work
considerations.
2 The internet of all things
As Internet-related technology evolves, the very own
concept behind the Internet has also changed. With the
advent of the Internet of (all) Things (IoT), the concept of
internet connectivity has been spreading to all types of
electronic devices [4]. IoT simply means the interconnec-
tion of vast heterogeneous network frameworks and sys-
tems in different patterns of communication, such as
human-to-human, human-to-thing, or thing-to-thing [17].
Moreover, IoT is a realm where physical items are
consistently integrated to form an information network
with the specific goal of providing advanced and smart
services to users [18].
Although the application areas of IoT systems may have
different goals, there is a set of characteristics and features
that must be supported by all IoT systems [19], regardless
of their application area, which are: (a) device hetero-
geneity; scalability; (b) ubiquitous data transmission;
(c) energy optimization; (d) localization and tracking
capability; (e) self-organizing ability; (f) data management
and interoperability; (g) security; and (h) privacy.
2.1 IoT architecture
As the growing number of proposed IoT architectures fail
to converge to a reference model [20], we can perceive the
critical need for a flexible layered architecture.
Of the existing models, the basic model is a three-layer
architecture like those proposed by Khan et al. [21], and
Yang et al. [22], consisting on the layers of perception,
network and application, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In recent
literature, other models have been proposed, which tend to
add more abstraction to the initial IoT architecture, such as
Atzori et al. [4], Khan et al. [21], and Yang et al. [22].
Considering, on the one hand, that in the existing liter-
ature the three-layer architecture is the most adopted [17]
and, on the other hand, the simplicity of this proposal, the
basis for our research was exactly this model. Conceptu-
ally, the three-layer model is composed of three layers
which can be described as follows [23]:
• Perception layer: Also known as the sensory layer, its
main objective is to collect data or act on the physical
environment [4].
• Network layer: Also known as the transmission layer,
its purpose is to transmit data between the perception
layer and the application layer of IoT systems, that is,
between sensors/actuators and services/users [24].
• Application layer: Also known as the business layer, it
gives to applications the ability to process, manage and
use data obtained at the perception layer about the
physical environment [17].
At topology level Zegzhda and Stepanova [25] state that
IoT systems could use the following three possibilities: a)
point to point; b) star; or c) mesh.
2.2 IoT standards and challenges
Different alliances, consortiums, special interest groups,
and standard development organizations have proposed a
considerable amount of communication technologies for
IoT, which generates a big challenge for end-to-end secu-
rity in IoT applications [26].
Most popular technologies for IoT include infrastructure
protocols like IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4, BLE, Wire-
lessHART, Z-Wave, LoRaWAN, 6LoWPAN, DTLS and
RPL, and application protocols like CoAP and MQTT.
Understanding IoT systems is not an easy task because
there are many challenges that need to be addressed, such
as availability, reliability, mobility, performance, scalabil-
ity, interoperability, security, privacy, device management,
and trust. Addressing these challenges allows service pro-
viders as well as application developers to deploy IoT
services efficiently. Most of the identified challenges were
addressed by the studies presented by Gubbi et al. [27],
Gluhak et al. [28], Sheng et al. [29], Stankovic [30], Chen
et al. [31] and Al-Fuqaha et al. [17]. In addition, there were
some research and development projects such as IoT6,
Ziegler et al. [20] which aimed to investigate IoT chal-
lenges and shortcomings and provide guidance for their
solutions.
2.3 IoT security and threats
In cyber security, the Confidentiality—Integrity—Avail-
ability (CIA) triad is well known. Known, although only a
small part of the existing literature relates CIA back to IoT.




Besides CIA, Lin et al. [23] adds more features to be
addressed like Identification and Authentication, Privacy
and Trust. Alaba et al. [16] outlined some security chal-
lenges in each layer of IoT architecture, therefore pre-
senting the most common vulnerabilities and attacks.
In the perception layer, the main security threats are the
forging of collected data and the destruction of perception
devices by the following attacks: (a) node capture;
(b) malicious code injection; (c) false data injection;
(d) replay or freshness; (e) cryptoanalysis and side channel;
(f) eavesdropping and interference; and (g) sleep
deprivation.
The network layer is faced with threats to the avail-
ability of network resources through multiple types of
attacks, such as network scans, denial of service (DoS),
jamming, spoofing, sinkholes, wormholes, man-in-the-
middle (MITM), routing information, sybil and unautho-
rized access.
Finally, the main concerns of the application layer are
software attacks like phishing attacks, malicious virus/-
worms, botnets, and malicious scripts.
In order to protect IoT systems from the security threads
mentioned above, one can also use some conventional
security countermeasures that have been implemented in
conventional ICT systems such as applications, services,
communications, cloud-based systems, among others [17].
Among these security countermeasures we can find solu-
tions such as firewall, intrusion detection and prevention
systems, authentication and authorization mechanisms,
audit processes and data encryption application.
3 Flow-based monitoring
Network traffic monitoring and analyses represents a key
component for network administration as it allows the
development of several types of mechanisms, such as flow
analysis, threats and anomalies detection, and performance
monitoring.
3.1 Network flow monitoring
Network traffic monitoring approaches have been proposed
and developed throughout the years. They can be classified
as active or passive.
Whereas active approaches, such as the ones imple-
mented by tools such as Ping, Traceroute, SNMP, and
NETCONF, inject traffic into a network to perform dif-
ferent types of measurements and to perform analysis,
passive approaches observe existing traffic as it passes by a
measurement point and therefore observe and collect traffic
generated by users and systems for being analysed [32].
Packet capture and flow export are common passive
monitoring approaches. In the first, complete packets are
captured providing deep insight into the traffic. This
approach requires some hardware and infrastructure for
storage and analysis.
Flow export aggregates packets into flows and exports
them to a collector for storage and analysis. In our pro-
posal, we follow the revised definition of flow proposed by
Velan [33]. His definition is drawn on the Claise et al. [34]
initial conceptualization.
If used in high-speed networks, this approach is more
scalable and less costly than packet capture due to the
integration of flow export protocols into network devices,
such as routers, switches, and firewalls. Other advantages
are the reduction of the amount of data stored, the possible
use for forensic investigation, and the achievement of the
privacy of the traffic data captured, since traditionally only
packet headers are considered.
3.2 Flow monitoring architecture
The typical architecture of flow monitoring setups consists
of several steps [35], each of which is explained bellow and
are represented in Fig. 2.
Packet observation is the process of capturing packets
from the line and pre-processing them for further use. This
stage involves capturing packets from an observation point
that is part of an observation domain.
The Flow Metering & Export stage is where packets are
aggregated into flows and flow records are exported.
Flow records are defined in Claise et al. [34] as ‘‘in-
formation about a specific flow that was observed at an
observation point’’, which include flow keys, such as
characteristic properties of a flow (e.g., IP addresses and
port numbers), and measured properties (e.g., packet and
byte counters).
In Data Collection, the flow collectors are an important
step of flow monitoring setups, as they receive, store and
pre-process flow data from one or more flow exporters.
The flow data storage format is an important charac-
teristic of the flow data collecting stage because it defines
the performance and functionality level of the flow
collectors.
Data Analysis is the final stage in a flow monitoring
setup. There are three main areas where analyses of flow
data can be applied [36]: (a) Flow analysis & reporting;
(b) Threat detection; and (c) Performance monitoring.
Fig. 2 Architecture of a flow monitoring setup. Adapted from [36]
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The applicability statement of IPFIX issued by the IETF
[37] and Li et al. [38] survey on network flow applications
should also be considered for exploring more applications
examples of flow data analysis.
4 IOT intrusion detection
4.1 Intrusion detection systems
According to Halme and Bauer [39], an Intrusion Detection
System is ‘‘…an anti-intrusion approach that aims to
discriminate intrusion attempts and intrusion preparation
from normal system usage…’’. A typical IDS is composed
of sensors, an analysis engine and a reporting system.
Sensors are positioned at different network places or hosts,
and their main task is to collect data. The data collected is
sent to the analysis engine, which is responsible for
examining the collected data and detecting intrusions. If an
intrusion is detected by the analysis engine, then the
reporting system generates an alert to the network
administrator.
Intrusion Detection Systems can be classified as Host-
based IDS (HIDS) or Network-based IDS (NIDS). HIDS is
attached to a device/host and monitors malicious activities
occurring within the system. NIDS connects to one or more
network segments and monitors network traffic for mali-
cious activities [14].
IDS placement strategical approaches can be classified
as distributed, centralized or hybrid [13]. In the centralised
approach the entire IDS is placed in a central, either remote
or host-based location. In the distributed strategy, the IDS
nodes are placed in network nodes and the responsibility is
divided amongst them. The hybrid placement strategy
combines any strategy of the above and is often found in
tandem with multiple detection types.
IDS detection methods approaches can be classified as
signature-based, anomaly-based, specification based, or
hybrid [13]. In signature-based approaches, IDS detect
attacks when system or network behaviour matches an
attack signature stored in the IDS internal databases. If a
given system or network activity matches with stored
patterns/signatures, then an alert will be triggered. This
approach is accurate and very efficient at detecting known
threats, and their mechanism is easy to understand. How-
ever, this approach is ineffective to detect new attacks and
variations of known attacks, as a matching signature for
these attacks is still unknown.
Anomaly-based IDSs compare the activities of a system
at a given instant with a normal behaviour profile and
generate the alert whenever a deviation from normal
behaviour exceeds a threshold. This approach is efficient to
detect new attacks, however, anything that does not match
to a normal behaviour is considered an intrusion and
learning the entire scope of the normal behaviour is not a
simple task.
Specification is a set of rules and thresholds that define
the expected behaviour for network components such as
nodes, protocols, and routing tables. Specification-based
approaches detect intrusions when network behaviour
deviates from specification definitions. Therefore, specifi-
cation-based detection has the same purpose of anomaly-
based detection: identifying deviations from normal beha-
viour. However, there is one important difference between
these methods: in specification-based approaches, a human
expert should manually define the rules of each specifica-
tion. Manually defined specifications usually provide lower
false positive rates in comparison with the anomaly-based
detection.
Hybrid approaches will involve any combination of the
above, whereby issues related to the efficacy of one tech-
nique is mitigated by the strengths of another.
Conventional intrusion detection systems use deep
packet or state-full protocol inspection to detect intrusions
or attacks. Deep packet inspection (DPI) techniques scan
the packet header and examine its payload and filter the
packet content searching for any attack traces [40].
Though, DPI is impractical for high-speed links [41] and
inspection is not possible when the packet payload is
encrypted.
In state-full protocol inspection (SPI), the semantics of
the protocol are verified and any out of the range register is
considered an intrusion or anomaly. On the downside, this
technique is specific and cannot be used on unknown
protocols. Finally, both techniques are computationally
costly and could create a bottleneck [42, 43].
Considering both the limitations of the presented tech-
niques, and considering the information presented above,
an alternative solution for IoT networks against intrusions
and attacks could be an IP flow-based IDS [1].
4.2 Flow-based IDS solutions
Flow-based intrusion detection is an active area of research
and this type of systems are based on the generic IDS
model proposed by Garcia-Teodoro et al. [44]. In recent
years, some research has been published on this topic.
Sperotto et al. [35] and Umer et al. [45] have published
some of the most relevant research on this topic.
Sperotto et al. [35] made an overview of IP flow-based
intrusion detection and their approach consists in summa-
rizing each research made in this area according to the type
of attack that could be detected. After presenting a list of
the various categories of attacks the authors mentioned that
since this type of intrusion detection only relies on the
packet header information, it can only address a subset of
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the attacks already identified. Despite their valuable effort,
the authors have only reviewed approaches focused on
detecting DoS, Scans, Worms, and Botnet attacks. Sperotto
et al. [35] also point out some advantages and disadvan-
tages of using this type of technique. The main advantages
are that only flow records are analysed, the flow records
contain aggregated information of packet headers, the
traffic information is summarized in IP flows reducing the
amount of data that needs to be processed, thus having a
near real time response, low deployment cost, fewer pri-
vacy concerns and the fact that it can be used with
encrypted protocols. As disadvantages the authors mention
that since the IP flow records only contain generalized
network information, it is therefore difficult to detect some
attacks using just generalized information. As packet
payload are not scanned, the detection of network attacks
hidden in the packet payload is not so accurate as packet-
based detection.
Umer et al. [45] provided a comprehensive analysis on
the state of art of flow-based intrusion detection. Addi-
tionally, they proposed a taxonomy for flow-based IDS
based on the techniques used for intrusion detection using
flow records. The authors have also identified important
challenges for future research in this area, such as the
development of public flow-based datasets with a variety of
attacks, the relationship between flow attributes and attack
types, the evolving into Network Behaviour Analysis
(NBA), among others. The same authors performed their
research by revising all the identified literature according to
the techniques that have been used. As a complement the
authors have also reported some advantages and disad-
vantages for each main category. The main categories
proposed were: (a) Statistical; (b) Machine Learning; and
(c) Other Techniques.
Based on the works previously mentioned, several flow-
based techniques using statistical and machine learning
methods have been proposed with the aim of detecting
malicious flows.
In Abuadlla et al. [46], the authors have proposed a two-
stage neural network for intrusion detection using flow
records. The first stage detects changes in the traffic that
could be an attack. If an attack is detected, the flow data is
forwarded to a second stage classifier which determines the
type of attack. The technique has been assessed, and the
first stage gives 94.2% detection rate and 3.4% false pos-
itive rate. For the second stage, best detection rate of
99.42% is also obtained with a false positive rate of 2.6%.
An improved nature-inspired technique for optimum-
path forest clustering (OPFC) is proposed in Costa et al.
[47]. The approach was evaluated, and results show that the
optimum-path forest clustering outperforms k-means and
SOM in flow-based detection.
A ward clustering approach to detect the dictionary
attacks over SSH is presented by Satoh et al. [48]. The best
results include a 99.90% detection rate for unsuccessful
SSH attack attempts and 92.80% detection of successful
SSH attempts.
Although there is extensive work in flow-based intrusion
detection, our approach significantly differs from the
existing work because the target is not a high-speed net-
work and we do not want to use an in-line probe making
use of a hardware-acceleration card with FPGA in order to
reduce CPU load during packet capture and guarantee
packet capture without loss under modest CPU [36]. Our
goal is to design an IDS for IoT considering IoT features/
characteristics such as architecture, scalability, heteroge-
neous devices and communications, integration with the
physical world, resource constraints, privacy, the large
scale, trust management, and less preparation for security.
4.3 IDS solutions for IoT
In recent years, several review articles have been published
on IDSs for technologies related to IoT such as mobile ad
hoc networks, wireless sensor networks, cloud computing,
and cyber-physical systems. Although these articles pri-
marily focus on the design of IDSs for several IoT related
elements, only some of them (Zarpelao et al. [13], Santos
et al. [14], and Hajiheidari et al. [15]) provide a study on
IDS techniques specific for the IoT paradigm.
Nevertheless, there are some researchers that have
already started to address IDS in the IoT context. In their
research Liu et al. [49] proposed a signature-based IDS that
employs Artificial Immune System mechanisms. Detectors
with attack signatures were modelled as immune cells that
can classify datagrams. The work does not indicate in
which way this approach could be implemented in IoT
networks and computational overhead needed to run
learning algorithms might be a disadvantage.
On the other hand, Kasinathan et al. [50] proposed a
centralized solution where their main objective is to detect
DoS attacks in 6LoWPAN-based networks. In order to
implement the IDS, the authors adapted to 6LoWPAN
networks a known signature-based method, called Suricata.
After considering their initial research, Kasinathan et al.
[51] extended their work and reached a more complete set
of assumptions.
Raza et al. [7] presented an IDS for IoT named
SVELTE, whose objective is to detect sinkhole and
selective forwarding attacks. This IDS had the participation
of the border router and network nodes in the detection
system. This work implements a hybrid approach to the
detection method, trying to balance the computing cost of
the anomaly-based method and the storage cost of the
signature-based method. SVELTE was extended by
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Shreenivas et al. [52] with an intrusion detection module
that uses the ETX (Expected Transmissions) metric. Their
experimental results show that compared with rank-only
mechanisms the overall true positive rate increases.
A work presented by Jun and Chi [53] proposed the use
of Complex Event-Processing (CEP) techniques for intru-
sion detection on IoT. The results achieved indicated that
their approach was more CPU intensive, consumed less
memory and took less processing time than traditional IDS.
Pongle and Chavan [54] proposed an IDS for IoT where
network nodes must detect changes in their neighbourhood
and must send information to centralized modules running
in the border router. The results showed their solution is
appropriate for IoT since its power and memory con-
sumption are low.
Midi et al. [55] present an IDS for IoT called Knowl-
edge-driven Adaptable Lightweight Intrusion Detection
System (Kalis). The approach for detecting intrusions is
based on the fact that Kalis is a self-adapting, knowledge-
driven IDS for IoT systems running different communi-
cation protocols. Experimental tests have shown very good
results on detection of DoS, routing and conventional
attacks compared with traditional IDS.
Aloqaily et al. [56] introduced an intrusion detection
mechanism to resist attack such as Denial of Service,
Probe, Remote to user, etc. The authors proposed deep
belief network for data dimension reduction, and decision
tree using ID3 algorithm for intrusion classification. The
detection accuracy of the systems is 99.92% which is quite
high; however, the false negative rate is 1.53%.
Diro and Chilamkurti [57] proposed a deep learning-
based and centralized method to detect the attacks in social
IoT. Since fog nodes are closer to the smart infrastructure
of social IoT, they are used to educate and maintain IDS at
the edge of distributed fog networks. In the performance
evaluation, the proposed method is evaluated over NSL-
KDD dataset. High detection accuracy, online and low
false positive rate are the upsides of the method and high
training time and several resources usage in training are
downsides of it.
Li et al. [58] proposed an AI-based two-stage IDS which
detects an anomaly in the network by capturing network
flows. In the first phase, the Bat algorithm with Swarm
Division and Binary Differential Mutation are used to
extract features of the network. In the second phase, the
Random Forest is used as a classifier to classify the net-
work flows. For evaluation, KDD Cup 1999 dataset has
been used. Evaluation results have validated the optimality
of the proposed algorithms in achieving high accuracy and
low overhead. The disadvantage of the method is that it is
not implemented and evaluated in real-world scenarios.
Deng et al. [59] studied and presented the current
challenges of IoT network intrusion detection and
discussed the IoT architecture. In-depth, they studied and
evident that using data mining and machine learning
technique to solve the problem of anomaly and intrusion
IoT network traffic identification is an excellent topic and
proposed a new solution. The paper proposes a new
intrusion detection scheme for Internet of things, that is,
lightweight intrusion detection method combined with
FCM algorithm and PCA algorithm. Simulation results
show that the proposed method can improve the detection
efficiency and make the false positive rate lower.
Gajewskiet al. [60] proposed an IDS for smart home
systems where the local resource monitoring and prelimi-
nary log analysis was made to the Home Gateway device,
whereas the processing of the long-term anomaly analysis
of the user’s behaviour is done at the ISP premises.
Pajouh et al. [61] presented an anomaly IDS built with
Two-layer Dimension Reduction and Two-tier Classifica-
tion (TDTC) for IoT Backbone. They concentrated mainly
on most common low-frequency attacks while their
experiments were based on NSL-KDD dataset. They star-
ted with Naive Bayes (NB) for anomaly detection then
results are refined with Certainty Factor version of
K-Nearest Neighbour (CF-KNN). Their work proved
computation reduction with faster detection and less
resource requirements. They achieved a detection rate of
about 84.86% for binary classification with 4.86% of false
alarm.
Siddiqui and Boukerche [62] have proposed a network-
based intrusion detection method which learns patterns of
normal flows in a temporal codebook. Based on the tem-
porally learnt codebook, they proposed a feature repre-
sentation method to transform the flow-based statistical
features into more discriminative representations, called
TempoCode-IoT. They developed an ensemble of machine
learning-based classifiers optimized to discriminate the
malicious flows from the normal ones. The effectiveness of
the proposed method was empirically evaluated on a real-
istic dataset (CICIDS2017) as well as on a real botnet
infected IoT dataset (NBaIoT), achieving high accuracies
and low false positive rates across a variety of intrusion
attacks.
Eskandari et al. [63] proposed Passban IDS. The pro-
posed IDS is able to apply a protection layer on IoT devices
which are directly connected to it. The attacks targeted by
the system are Port Scanning, HTTP and SSH brute force
and SYNflood. The system does not require intensive cal-
culations and can be deployed also on cheap edge devices
and/or IoT gateways. While the IDS aim to protect devices
against a relatively low number of attacks, the system
shows a very low false positive rate and high accuracy.
Regardless of the considerable evolution in the devel-
opment of IDS solutions specifically designed for IoT
networks [64], existing solutions still have numerous
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limitations. Some solutions require considerable computa-
tional overhead or modification of IoT devices software
which in a resource constraint environment is a disadvan-
tage. Existing solutions do not guarantee the protection
against more than one or two types of attacks, as well as
not being able to handle more than one technology IoT. In
addition, just a few solutions concern the security of IDS
alert traffic and management. In sum, a new improved




The vast array of IoT applications in diverse domains will
require a wide coverage of the security in IoT infrastruc-
tures. A solution for this challenge will certainly include
the ability to, in a timely manner, detect attacks and
intrusions in IoT devices, communications, and
applications.
As presented in the previous sections, there is a lack of
systems and mechanisms designed specifically and able to
guarantee security of IoT networks. With this challenge in
mind, an effort has been made to define and present the set
of requirements inherent to the design of an IDS solution
specific aimed at IoT networks:
• Cross-layer detection: The IDS should be able to detect
attacks at all layers of IoT architecture.
• External and internal intrusion detection: ability to
detect intrusions originated at external hosts and at
internal devices.
• Near real time detection: ability to detect intrusions
within a reasonable time frame.
• Scalability: capability to accommodate a growing
amount of analysis that results from the expansion of
IoT network in terms of size or traffic.Interoperability
and extensibility: support different communication
channels and protocols, intrusion detection mecha-
nisms, among others. Must be extensible to new
standards, technologies, and intrusion types as they
emerge.
• Reconfigurability: supports different intrusion policies
throughout the IoT system lifetime.
• No software changes: minimization of the IDS footprint
in the use of resources and software modification in IoT
devices.
• No performance overhead: the IDS should not impact
the performance of the IoT devices’ applications.
• Protection of IDS communications: ensure security of
communications between probes and IDS components.
The flow-based intrusion detection framework we
describe in the following sections was designed to respond
to the previous set of requirements. We start by analysing
the system architecture of the proposed framework in what
concerns its intrusion detection on IoT networks and their
components.
5.2 Architecture and components
The design of intrusion detection solutions for IoT net-
works must make minimal use of the resources accessible
in constrained IoT devices while, on the other hand, it
could benefit from the availability of more resources in
other types of devices, such as border routers or cloud-
based systems.
Considering the requirements presented before, a solu-
tion able to ensure the non-modification of software on IoT
devices and a minimal use of resources should be based on
a hybrid placement strategy. For this type of environments,
we argued that the most adequate solution is the use of a
combination of a distributed capture of data alongside a
centralized analysis of the network traffic data.
In Fig. 3 one can perceive the architecture of the pro-
posed intrusion detection framework to be applied to IoT
networks.
In order to minimize issues related to the demanding
requirements for efficient detection capabilities adapt-
able to the various types of (internal and external) threats
and to the wide variety of IoT technologies, in the proposed
artefact the monitoring and capture of IoT communications
will be done in the three layers of the IoT architecture
(perception,
network, and application), as illustrated in Fig. 3. This
three-layer solution ensures the detection of intrusions that
may occur in any layer of an IoT application. The capture
of these communications will be done using probes that
will be placed in all layers. These probes locations provide
a holistic view of the IoT application and could be a pos-
itive point to the detection of intrusions or attacks.
The various stages of the proposed IDS are the follow-
ing (Fig. 4): capturing communications, exporting IP flows,
collecting IP flows, and analysis of IP flows. In the pro-
posed flow-based IDS framework, the probes are respon-
sible for capturing the communications and converting
them into IP flow records of the network section where
they are present.
In the perception layer, the probes will act as dedicated
devices and will be capturing the internal communications
of the IoT networks. The internal IoT communications
(made by sensors, actuators, among others), could be done
using multiple technologies and protocols (eg.: 802.15.4,
BLE, 802.11, etc.). The probes used in the perception layer
must support the IoT technologies and protocols used and
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thereby ensure the technological coverage through minimal
hardware adjustments.
The probes located in the network layer, will capture
incoming and outgoing communications that pass through
the interfaces of routing devices. In these cases, probes
functions may be supported by the firmware of the routing
devices, thus avoiding the installation of any additional
software. The probe responsible for capturing the
Fig. 3 Architecture of the
proposed flow-based IDS for
IoT
Fig. 4 Framework of proposed
flow-based IDS for IoT
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communications at the application layer will be installed in
the routing device to which the IoT smart service will
connect. The goal is capturing the communications made to
this access point.
Once captured, all communications will be converted in
IPFIX flow records and then exported to the IDS modules.
The probes must be able to communicate near real time
with the IDS modules enabling intrusion detection in useful
time. The IPFIX flow records collected by the perception
and network layers probes will be exported to a local IDS
module. The IPFIX flow records collected by the applica-
tion layer probes will be exported and forwarded to the
remote IDS module.
All stored IPFIX flow records in the IDS modules will
be analysed and if any intrusion is detected, an IDS alert
message will be stored in the IDS alert database.
In terms of communications exchanged between the
components of the proposed IDS framework, they must be
preferably be made using hard-wired links, and be trans-
mitted using an encrypted link (IPFIX over TLS over
TCP), in order to ensure the security and privacy of IPFIX
messages. In addition, communications between perception
and network layers probes and local IDS module must use
a dedicated VLAN for this type of communications, adding
another layer of security to internal communications of the
proposed IDS framework.
5.3 Detection methodology
With the purpose of detecting intrusions, our proposal to
analyse IoT communications is a solution that will use a
detection method based on detailed specifications. The
analysis of the IPFIX flow records made by IDS modules
will be done in a centralized manner, making use of
external devices relatively to the IoT application. These
external devices have the computational resources that this
analysis technique requires, releasing IoT devices from
these tasks and assuring scalability to the proposed
solution.
Thus, to detect intrusions, it is proposed that the analysis
of the IPFIX flow records should be done in a local device
and in a remote device installed in a cloud-based system.
The process of analysing individual IP flow records should
comply with the schema illustrated in Fig. 5.
Regarding the analysis of the collected IP flow records,
both local and remote IDS modules have responsibilities in
the analysis process as the result of their expected com-
putational capabilities.
Given that the specification-based detection method is
not so computationally demanding, this detection method
can be applied to the analysis made on both IDS modules.
As mentioned, in the cases where the border router has
some computational capacity available, it can host the local
IDS module as an integrated module of the router software.
Otherwise, if the border router does not have the compu-
tational capabilities needed, the local IDS module may be
installed on a dedicated device. To perform the analysis of
the communications collected by the probes, the IDS
modules will query a knowledge database with specifica-
tions of the traffic expected and considered normal for the
IoT application within the operation scope. This knowledge
database can be updated or reviewed whenever changes are
made in the IoT application or whenever new specifications
of IoT standards or protocols arise. When a threat or attack
is detected, an IDS alert message will be generated and
registered in the IDS alert database available in the IDS
modules.
5.4 System analysis
As mentioned before, it was indicated that doing the
analysis of the IP flow records collected by probes located
in the three layers of the IoT architecture, significantly
increases the capacity of intrusion detection in an IoT
application. In addition, since traffic flow records are
exported in a near real-time manner, this allows for the
detection of intrusions to happen within a reasonable time
frame.
In terms of scalability, it can be ensured in different
manners. The use of an IDS based on IP flow analysis
ensures that the size of the information collected on the IoT
communications is considerably smaller (0.1%), than sys-
tems based on network packet analysis. Thus, if there is a
large growth in the number of devices and communications
to be analysed, the impact will not be immediate, either in
terms of storage capacity or in terms of increased band-
width usage.
Due to the use of IP-based communications, interoper-
ability between systems can be ensured by the fact that the
vast majority of IoT technologies support or are about to
support the IP protocol (examples: BLE, 802.15.4 and
RFID). Another important aspect is that the flow records
are exported using the IPFIX standard instead of the pro-
prietary NetFlow solution. Lastly, intrusion alert messages
use the standard syslog, thus allowing their use and inte-
gration with other security monitoring mechanisms and
tools.
The reconfiguration of the proposed IDS is possible due
to the possibility that the specification database may be
updated or modified whenever changes are made to the IoT
system.
Due to the use of probes and IDS modules implemented
in IoT devices with available computational resources and
integrated support for collecting and exporting IP traffic
flows through the IPFIX protocol, there is no need to
change the software or firmware of the IoT devices or
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services. Nevertheless, in these situations, there is a con-
sumption of the computational resources associated with
the probe and the IDS module operation.
In order to ensure the security and privacy of the com-
munications exchanged between the various components of
the proposed IDS, these are transmitted using encryption
methods. In the case of IPFIX communications between the
probes and IDS modules, they must be made using the TLS
over TCP protocol. For intrusion alert messages (that are
sent via syslog to other non-IDS security mechanisms),
these should also be sent using the TLS over TCP protocol.
6 Framework evaluation
In this section, we introduce a performance evaluation of
the proposed intrusion detection framework. We present
the application of a prototype in a real environment that
incorporates sensors, actuators and IoT services that will
allow for the generation of diverse IoT-based communi-
cations. With this test we aimed at validating and testing
the artefact int terms of its data collection, storage and
communications analysis capacities.
6.1 Experimental testbed
The developed prototype (represented in Fig. 6), aimed at
simulating a real environment of an IoT system and con-
templates an application scenario, with the use of several
devices that use CoAP and MQTT application protocols, in
order to perform data exchange between sensors, actuators,
and IoT services.
It was included the use of CoAP clients and servers, as
well as MQTT publishers, brokers, and subscribers. In
addition to these, two more devices were available. In this
context a Raspberry PI was used to act as border router
where the IDS probe was deployed, while on the other
device (Ubuntu Server 1) was the IDS module. Finally,
there was also a device that would work as a generator of
attacks and intrusions to the IoT system and inherent
services.
The attacks were executed using net scan tools such as
nmap and hping, performing network analysis, flood, and
DoS attacks, as well as through invalid or abnormal MQTT
and CoAP actions.The IDS probe was implemented in the
border router and was responsible for network packet
observation, aggregation of packet information into traffic
streams, and exporting (through the IPFIX protocol) IP
traffic flow records that were transmitted between the
border router network interfaces. Thus, IoT communica-
tions between the internal network and the Internet, i.e.
between IoT service clients and IoT service servers, were
also monitored.
The probe used was an open source solution developed
by Carnegie Mellon University’s CERT group, YAF (Yet
another Flowmeter). YAF supports all IEs selected for use
in the framework.
YAF was configured with the following characteristics:
• Packet capture on the WAN interface.
• Real-time capture with PF_RING library.
• Exporting using IPFIX over TLS over TCP.
The IDS module was implemented in the host (Ubuntu
Server 1) and was responsible for collecting traffic flow
records sent over the IPFIX protocol, analysing the stored
IP traffic flow records based on the specification database,
and generating intrusion alert messages.
For collection, decoding and storing the IP traffic flow
records exported by the probe we used an open source
solution developed by Carnegie Mellon University’s CERT
group, the super_mediator. Super_mediator is an IPFIX
protocol message receiver and decoder and can be used
simultaneously with YAF.




The super_mediator was configured with the following
functions:
• To listen to the Fast Ethernet network interface.
• To receive flow records through the IPFIX over TLS
over TCP.
• To store flow records in JSON files.
During the process of receiving and storing traffic flow
records, JSON files were created and added in a host
directory where super_mediator was running. Figure 7
shows the structure of only one IPFIX flow record.
In order to analyse the logs of IP flow records that were
stored in JSON files, a Python IDS application was
developed considering the workflow illustrated in Fig. 8.
The developed IDS application reads the database of
specifications about the normal behaviour of IoT commu-
nications based on the CoAP and MQTT protocols. These
parameters were obtained by analysing the specifications of
the CoAP and MQTT protocols and, in addition, consid-
ering an analysis of .
CoAP and MQTT traffic in a real environment made in
previous works [65–67]. In their works, authors analysed
IP flow records obtained from a IoT environment and
concluded that a normal flow related with a confirmable
piggybacked CoAP GET or POST message must have the
following features: flowendreason is active/idle; octetto-
talcount and reverseoctettotalcount are[ 32 bytes; pack-
ettotalcount and reversepackettotalcount is 1:1;
databytecount and reversedatabytecount are[ 4 bytes;
protocolidentifier is 17.
The most common CoAP messages were GET, POST,
and GET Observe with piggybacked acknowledgment.
MQTT messages were published and subscribed with QoS
level 0. Thus, the specifications that allows to determine if
a CoAP and MQTT traffic flow record is normal or
abnormal were obtained.
Each new flow record was compared with the previously
loaded specifications. In cases where the flow record was
classified as normal, its verification process ended imme-
diately, returning to the process of checking for new
records. In case a flow record was classified as abnormal,
the IDS would generate an intrusion alert message via the
syslog protocol. This message would be stored in the IDS
system log file and was sent via the same protocol to
integrate other monitoring tools such as a SIEM.
6.2 Validation results analysis
The test plan used the prototype presented in the previous
section and was implemented with the goal of evaluating
the proposed framework regarding its functionality, per-
formance, scalability, and security. The test plan was also
defined to demonstrate and validate the requirements and
characteristics defined for the framework.
To perform all the tests, all the IoT CoAP and MQTT
devices inherent to the prototype were activated to initiate
normal IoT traffic through data exchange between CoAP
clients and servers, as well as between MQTT publishers,
brokers, and subscribers. Next, the attacker device was
used to initiate the generation of abnormal and malicious
IoT traffic by exchanging data only between that device
and the CoAP servers. In addition, this attacking device
would also perform the role of MQTT publisher and topic
subscriber to the MQTT brokers operating on the proto-
type. In addition to normal and abnormal IoT communi-
cations, there were also a DNS and NTP service on the
internal network that also generated traffic between the
internal network devices and the Internet.
Then, on the IDS probe, YAF was simultaneously per-
formed to listen and capture the network packets exchan-
ged between the internal network IoT devices and the IoT
service servers that were found on the Internet. At the same




time, the network traffic was captured using the tcpdump
software on the border router so that we could record a
copy of the communications made between the probe and
the IDS module. After that, in the IDS module, the su-
per_mediator was executed to receive, decode, and store
the records of IP traffic flows exported by the probe
through IPFIX. After a few minutes, the YAF and tcpdump
processes were terminated on the IDS probe and the same
was made on the super_mediator process of the IDS
module.
Finally, in the IDS module, the IDS application was
executed. After loading the information from the specifi-
cation database, the application was able to read and
analyse the IP traffic flow records of normal and abnormal
IoT communications that were stored in JSON format in
the IDS module, which resulted in an IDS report.
6.2.1 Functionality tests
These tests were defined in order to test the functionality of
the framework regarding: (a) network packet capture and
consequently aggregating and exporting securely the cor-
responding IP traffic flow records by the IDS probe;
(b) reception, decoding and storage by the IDS module of
IP traffic flow records transmitted via the IPFIX protocol;
(c) analysis of IP traffic flow records stored in the IDS
module to detect IoT communications anomalies in the test
scenario; and (d) generation and storage of intrusion alert
messages.
In order to validate the functionality of the framework,
the results of the tests performed were demonstrated by
presenting and analysing the JSON files stored in the IDS
module containing the traffic flow records exported by the
IDS probe. These files showed the network packet capture
made by the IDS probe which, after aggregating them into
traffic flow records, exported them to the IDS module.
Fig. 7 Structure of one IPFIX flow record
Fig. 8 Workflow of IDS traffic flow analysis process
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In addition to those files, the network packets belonging
to the traffic exchanged between the internal network and
the Internet are also stored in the border router utilizing
PCAP files. The communications between the probe and
the IDS module were also presented and analysed.
Additionally, the IDS application reports, which were
stored in the IDS module and contained the results of the
analysis of traffic flow records indicating whether they
were classified as normal or abnormal, were considered.
Finally, the IDS application log files, which were stored
in the IDS module device, would contain the intrusion alert
messages generated and stored by the IDS application via
the syslog protocol.
In order to validate and test the IDS proposed in terms of
functionality of the probe and the IDS module, specifically
network packet capture and consequently aggregating and
exporting securely the corresponding IP traffic flow records
by the IDS probe, the PCAP files extracts presented in
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 demonstrated the existence of CoAP
traffic exchanged between server and client as well as the
IPFIX traffic exchanged between the probe and the IDS
module (made via TLS over TCP).
The reception, decoding and storage by the IDS module
of IP traffic flow records transmitted via the IPFIX protocol
can be demonstrated by observing Fig. 11. It shows the list
of files created in the local device folder by the super_-
mediator to store JSON files containing the IPFIX records.
Figure 12 presents the content of a JSON file containing
diverse IPFIX flow records stored in the IDS module.
In terms of validation and test of the IDS proposed for
the detection and identification of normal and abnormal
IoT communications through the analysis of IPFIX flow
records stored in the IDS module, we are able to detail that
the tests were divided into two different sets of IP flow
records. One test was done using only IP flow records from
normal communications and the other test was done only
with IP flow records from abnormal communications. Both
were compared and verified through the IDS application
that used the specifications stored in the specifications
database.
Figures 13, 14, 15, 16 show the results for each test of
the IoT traffic flow log analysis. The information presented
in each table indicates the type(s) of message(s) analysed
Fig. 9 Network traffic capture of GET CoAP messages
Fig. 10 Network traffic capture of CoAP over DTLS and IPFIX over
TLS over TCP
Fig. 11 Folder content with stored flow records
Fig. 12 JSON file content with received flow records
Fig.13 Tests results for normal CoAP flow records
Fig. 14 Tests results for normal MQTT flow records
Fig. 15 Tests results for abnormal CoAP flow records
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(normal or abnormal), the number of general IP flow
records in the dataset, the number of CoAP/MQTT IP flow
records in the dataset, the number of flow records that were
classified as normal (NFR), the number of flow records that
were classified as abnormal (AFR), the detection rate (DR),
the false positive rate (FP) and the rate of true positives
(TP).
The first test just used IP flow records from normal
communications generated by different types of messages
from CoAP and MQTT protocols. The results obtained
indicates that the specifications were well defined, and the
IDS application can classify as normal, with 100% of DR,
100% of TP and 0% of FP, all the IP flow records from
normal CoAP and MQTT communications that were
analysed.
The second test just used IP flow records from abnormal
communications generated by the attacker device using
different types of messages from CoAP and MQTT pro-
tocols. The results allowed to perceive that the specifica-
tions were well defined for most of the abnormal traffic.
The only exception were the IP flow records concerning the
flooding (1000) of CoAP and MQTT normal requests, due
to their similarity with the normal CoAP and MQTT
requests.
The IDS application was able to classify as abnormal,
with 100% of DR, 100% of TP and 0% of FP, all the IP
flow records from abnormal (net scan, invalid requests,
flood of invalid requests) CoAP and MQTT communica-
tions that were analysed. In terms of the analyses of IP flow
records from a flood of valid requests CoAP and MQTT,
the IDS application could only classify as abnormal, with
90% of DR, 100% of TP and 0% of FP, the flood of valid
requests CoAP. In relation to the flood of valid requests
MQTT, the IDS application could only classify as abnor-
mal, with 79% of DR, 100% of TP and 0% of FP.
To validate and test the proposed IDS in terms of the
functionality of the generation and storage of intrusion alert
messages by the IDS module, the IDS application prints the
results of the classification of the flow records as normal or
abnormal and also a summary of the tests that were done
(Fig. 17).
In the cases that the flow records were classified as
abnormal, the IDS application generated and stored a log
record in the syslog file as presented in Fig. 18.
6.2.2 Performance and scalability tests
These tests were defined to test the performance and
scalability of the framework regarding: (a) computational
resource consumption by IDS components; and (b) network
traffic overhead generated by the IDS proposed.
In order to validate the performance and scalability of
the framework, an analysis was made to the PCAP files
stored on the border router that contained the network
packet captures inherent to the traffic exchanged between
the internal network and the Internet, as well as the com-
munications between the probe and the IDS module. In
addition to those files we also used results of the analysis
made to the data related to the consumption of computa-
tional resources that was collected from the devices where
the probe and IDS module were running during the tests.
The computational resources analysed were related with
the CPU usage, RAM memory usage, disk or ROM
memory used by the probe and the module of the IDS. The
presentation of results related to the consumption of com-
putational resources is divided into two parts: probe and
IDS module.
Regarding the consumption of computational resources
that result from the operation of the IDS probe in the border
router, several measurements were performed to quantify,
in a more accurate manner, the resources that were con-
sumed. At the same time, in addition to measuring the
router in normal operation, the same measurements were
made for the operation of three different conventional IDS:
Snort, Suricata, and Zeek. Therefore, measurements were
performed considering the following features: CPU usage
Fig. 16 Tests results for abnormal MQTT flow records
Fig. 17 Output of the IDS application execution
Fig. 18 Syslog file content with alert messages
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(in percent and number of processes); RAM usage; per-
sistent memory usage (disk). Figure 19 presents the results
of a simulated network operation scenario with measure-
ments made with 50 Mbps of data bandwidth on the net-
work interface.
As one can perceive by analysing Fig. 19, it can be seen
that the YAF, used as a probe in the proposed prototype, is
the solution that consumes the least computational
resources when compared to the conventional IDS tested.
Particularizing CPU consumption, YAF measurements
showed that it does not add significant overhead compared
to normal operation, either at the used CPU percentage
level or in number of process. This can be explained by the
fact that YAF’s function is focused on packet capture and
flow records aggregation and exportation and does not
perform any analysis of packet information or content.
Regarding RAM consumption, YAF also did not cause a
large increase in the consumption of this type of resource
either, since it frequently exports the records present in the
cache memory. Finally, in terms of disk storage con-
sumption, YAF also did not create a large fingerprint on the
need to store information locally, since data was always
exported to another device.
About the consumption of computational resources that
result from the operation of the module of the IDS, several
measurements were made in order to quantify with accu-
racy the resources consumed, either by the super_mediator,
responsible for receiving, decoding and storing the flow
records, or by the IDS application, which is responsible for
analysing all new incoming flow records. Measurements
were performed for the following features: CPU usage (in
percent and number of processes); RAM usage; use of disk
storage. In an attempt to simulate network operation in
different scenarios, the measurements are based on three
data bandwidth situations on the IDS probe: 10Mbps,
25Mbps, and 50 Mbps. These results are described in
Fig. 20.
By analysing the graphics presented for each different
situation, it is possible to acknowledge that running the
super_mediator and an IDS application can be considered
as an IDS solution that consumes few computational
resources. Given the level of CPU consumption, the IDS
module measurements showed that it did not add signifi-
cant overhead compared to normal operation, either at the
CPU percentage level used or at the number of process
increases (two). This can be explained by the fact that the
functionality of the IDS module’s applications is simple
and focused on receiving, decoding, and storing traffic flow
and further analysis, without the need for processing more
complex tasks. As for RAM consumption, the IDS module
also did not cause a large increase in the consumption of
this type of resource. Finally, when it comes to disk storage
space consumption, the central module might have some
impact here if there is no policy of managing the files
where the records of traffic flows received are stored.
In terms of test and validation of the network traffic
overhead generated by the proposed IDS, this test aimed to
verify the amount of data used by the internal IDS mes-
sages, i.e. the IP traffic flow records sent between the probe
and the IDS module.
In Fig. 10 the extracts of the PCAP files resulting from
the traffic capture made in the border router can be verified.
These extracts refer to IPFIX traffic, namely the connection
between the probe and the IDS module.
Fig. 19 Probe resources
consumption with 50 Mbps
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Note that the size, in bytes, of the IPFIX data exchanged
between the probe and the IDS module is around 8 KB in a
180 s time period, which, in addition to the overhead
caused by using the TLS assumes a reduced overhead on
the level of communication channel used.
6.2.3 Security tests
Security tests were defined to test the security of the
framework regarding the confidentiality and the integrity of
the internal communications and messages exchanged
between IDS components (probe and IDS module).
In order to confirm the security assurance features of the
proposed framework, an analysis was made to the PCAP
files stored on the border router that contained the network
packet captures inherent to the traffic exchanged between
the internal network and the Internet, as well as the com-
munications between the probe and the IDS module.
The extracts that are presented in Fig. 10 refer to the
IPFIX traffic of the connection between the probe and the
IDS module. They refer to the process of exporting the
traffic flow records created by the probe through the IPFIX
over TLS over TCP. After some flow records stored in the
YAF cache reach any of the timeout timers (idle or active),
they are exported to the IDS module using the IPFIX over
TLS over TCP.
Given the test results, as expected, messages exchanged
between the probe and the IDS module were protected by
using the IPFIX over TLS over TCP, thus ensuring their
confidentiality and integrity.
6.3 Discussion
The framework validity was assessed by analysing and
evaluating the results of the performed tests. This evalua-
tion was focused on the functionality of the IDS compo-
nents that capture, export, collect, store, and analyse IoT
communications based on traffic flow records. In addition
to the functionality of the framework, the performance and
scalability of the solution were also evaluated, considering
the computational resources and bandwidth consumption.
Finally, the results of the internal communications security
tests of the proposed IDS system were validated.
The proposed solution showed the full functionality of
the various IDS components of the framework. As it was
described in the previous sections, the defined IDS com-
ponents have the capacity to: (a) observe network traffic;
(b) aggregate information about communications into
traffic flow records; (c) export flow records via IPFIX
secure connections; (d) collect, decode and store flow
records in databases; (e) analyse flow records to detect
anomalies in IoT communications; and (f) send intrusion
alert messages using a standard protocol such as syslog,
thus ensuring interoperability with other security and
monitoring mechanisms.
In terms of detection, with normal and abnormal traffic
tests the results achieved 100% on detection rate and true
positives, and 0% on false positive rates. In the specific
tests with anomalies based on flooding of normal applica-
tion requests, the detection rate was not 100% because it is
necessary to introduce extra request number validation
mechanisms over a given period.
In terms of the level of performance, the results
demonstrated and validated that the IDS probe and central




module do not require many computational resources
(processing, storage and communication) to operate and, in
some systems, they can be implemented on some IoT
devices with limited resources. Finally, the security tests on
the proposed solution have shown that the internal IDS
components of this framework can communicate with
confidentially and integrity using an encrypted channel for
transfer traffic flow records between the probe and the
central IDS module.
7 Conclusions
As the amount of IoT application deployments increases
across a variety of scenarios such as health, industry, etc.,
these applications and projects will use and transmit more
sensitive data. As such, ensuring the IoT data privacy and
security is mandatory. With preventive actions hard to be
applied due to architectural limitations, security solutions
must turn to second line methods of defence. We consid-
ered IDS as one such defence method and determined that
despite the diversity of IDS solutions for IoT available in
the market, none can protect against all categories of
threats and attacks (from the perception layer up), due to
their architectural application.
In this paper, we proposed a framework for an IDS
specifically focused on IoT networks based on the use of IP
flow records that will be captured by probes located in the
three layers of the IoT architecture. We presented a list of
system requirements, the design of a flow-based IDS for
IoT framework architecture, and described its main com-
ponents, features, and functions. In what concerns place-
ment strategy, a hybrid architecture is proposed that
includes both distributed data collection and centralized
intrusion detection analysis. This placement strategy pro-
posed allows the detection of threats or attacks originated
from external networks as well as from internal (compro-
mised) nodes in a near real-time manner. The proposed
distributed data collection is going to involve the use of
several probes that collect IP flow records and securely
send them to the local and remote IDS components.
To take benefits from the use of a lightweight and effi-
cient detection technique, our proposed framework uses a
specific detection method based on the normal behaviour of
IoT communications.
The proposed framework presented very good results in
terms of security, since it uses IPFIX and Syslog over TLS
over TCP to protect all communications done by the IDS
probe and module.
In terms of functionality, the tests showed very
promising results in terms of detection of normal IoT
communications since it had 100% of detection rate, 100%
of true positive rate, and 0% of False Positive rate in the
classification of normal flow records. Regardless of the
detection of abnormal IoT communications, the proposed
solution had also very good results in most of the tests with
100% of detection rate, 100% of true positive rate, and 0%
of False Positive rate.
Regardless of performance and scalability, this solution
ensures that there is a very low performance overhead and
no software changes on the IoT devices and application.
Interoperability and extensibility are also ensured due to
the use of standards for the collect and storage of IoT
communications data, and due to the use of a database with
the specifications stored that can be updated.
In our future work we plan to test and validate the
proposed framework in environments where communica-
tion technologies could be more diverse, such as 802.15.4,
BLE, and LoRaWAN, and using probes in all layers. In
addition, this framework will be tested using a widely used
dataset for intrusion detection in IoT systems to allow a
more effective comparison with other solutions in this field.
The support for intrusion detection of more threats (worms
and botnets) and improve the results of those already
supported, such as (D)DoS are also planned for future
work. Finally, we plan to use the correlation of data col-
lected in different IoT layers to improve the intrusion
detection mechanism.
Acknowledgements This work was supported by Portuguese national
funds through the FCT—Foundation for Science and Technology,
I.P., under the project UID/CEC/04524/2019.
References
1. Santos, L., Rabadão, C., Gonçalves, R.: Flow monitoring system
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